| Rebreather
Blunders
and Malfunctions
by Howard
Hall
Howard
and Thurlow with High Def system - ©Michele Hall
|
The
introduction of the ElectroLung during the late 1960s seemed
to herald a revolution within the sport diving industry. But
after a few short years and several deaths, this revolution
came to a crashing halt. The promise of silent, bubble-free
diving was replaced by a consensus that rebreathers promise
only death and multi-million dollar lawsuits.
Despite
the grim history and the prospect of certain death guaranteed
by many friends and colleagues, I found the dream of silent
diving almost overwhelming. Finally, in the late 1980s, opportunity
presented itself. I received a contract to make a film about
the Sea of Cortez. The film provided the funds and the justification
for pursuing rebreather technology. So in the spring of 1989,
Bob Cranston and I traveled to Philadelphia to train on a
pair of Biomarine 15.5 rebreathers.
The
Biomarine 15.5 was a prototype rebreather designed to replace
the US Navy's Mark 15. Fortunately for Bob and I, Biomarine
failed to acquire the Navy contract and this failure left
a couple dozen of these closed-circuit, mixed-gas rebreathers
drifting aimlessly in the civilian community. Biomarine had
two of these units at their Philadelphia factory and was willing
to loan them to us, assuming we were willing to pay a considerable
lease fee and, of course, sign a waiver that detailed the
various and likely ways we would almost certainly die using
the gear. A few months later, Bob and I donned our leased
rebreathers and made our first open water dive in the Sea
of Cortez. We were, at once, excited and terrified. We descended
to just over fifteen feet and made it back alive.
After
surviving the making of our Sea of Cortez film (Shadows in
a Desert Sea, WNET Nature), I acquired and highly modified
my own Biomarine 15.5 rebreather. My underwater crew and I
have been using rebreathers extensively ever since. And today
as I write this, floating on the Undersea Hunter above a beautiful
Fijian reef, I celebrated logging my 1,000th closed-circuit
hour. That was the only event worth celebrating today, however.
During today's dive my trimix computer screen went blank soon
after beginning a descent to 270 feet where Bob and I planned
to use two underwater IMAX® systems to film Richard Pyle collecting
rare fish. Bob's camera jammed after running for only ten
seconds. My camera failed to run at all. Our reward for total
underwater cinematic failure was to spend three hours decompressing.
Our rebreathers, however, worked great! And rebreather reliability
is not something to be taken for granted.
During
my 1,000 hours of rebreather diving, the rather high frequency
of equipment malfunction has only been exceeded by the much
higher frequency of stupid diver mistakes. The editors of
Oceans Illustrated believe this magazine's readers may benefit
from a chronicle of these dangerous blunders, despite the
humiliation such recounting may cause members of my crew and
me. My hesitation at humiliating myself by admitting numerous
stupid, life-threatening errors while diving closed-circuit
is, however, well off-set by the pleasure I take in recounting
the stupid mistakes my friends have made.
Always
assume your rebreather is going to malfunction at any moment.
Always
assuming that your rebreather is going to malfunction, is
a life extending mind-set. The two rebreathers that I leased
for my Sea of Cortez film were only 50% reliable. That is
to say that the unit Bob used seemed to work just fine most
of the time and the one I used almost never worked properly.
Since I was paying the lease fees, this seemed completely
unfair to me. But Bob never seemed inclined to trade units
with me. During our second open water dive (the first having
been the intrepid descent to fifteen feet) my rebreather showed
an alarm light just after we reached the bottom in sixty feet
of water. Seeing the alarm light, I suddenly felt my worst
fears had come true. In a moment I was sure to die of oxygen
toxicity! I stopped on the top of a rock, grabbed my open
circuit bailout regulator (which at the time was attached
to a 15 cf tank that hung from my BC harness) and hoped I
could get the regulator clear before the inevitable convulsion.
The seizure didn't come. After checking my secondary display
(which shows the oxygen pressure readings on each of three
oxygen sensors), I realized that death was not so imminent.
Few
things actually happen fast when using a rebreather. I had
plenty of time to realize that my on-board computer (which
controls the rebreather's gas mixtures) had failed and that
I would have to add oxygen manually. In fact, I would have
had ten minutes or more to sort the problem out even after
the rebreather had quite working. Checking my instruments
had easily averted a problem.
The
rebreather I used in the Sea of Cortez helped train me to
regularly check my instruments. The rebreather encouraged
regular instrument checks by failing to function properly
on 80% of my dives. An argument can be made for owning a rebreather
that almost never works right, since frequent failures encourage
good instrument monitoring habits and familiarity with emergency
procedures. Personally, however, I wouldn't go so far as purposely
seeking out unreliable rebreather designs. However, there
is inherent danger in rebreathers that work flawlessly almost
all the time. Richard Pyle, an ichthyologist famous for discovering
new fish species while diving his Cis-Lunar rebreather to
over 400 feet, calls this the "Richard Pyle rebreather paradox."
The paradox states that, while everyone desires a rebreather
that is reliable, reliability begets complacency.
Check
your instruments
The
importance of frequent rebreather instrument checks cannot
be over emphasized. Since Bob Cranston's rebreather worked
pretty well in the Sea of Cortez, he developed less disciplined
instrument checking skills than I did. A flawlessly working
rebreather is almost as dangerous as a completely unreliable
unit since reliability encourages instrument complacency.
Bob discovered the wisdom of this during a dive in Grand Cayman.
We
were filming yellow-head jawfish in fifty feet of water below
the boat early one morning. Bob had not had his second cup
of coffee. After about fifteen minutes lying quietly on the
bottom, Bob was suddenly stricken with dizziness and tunnel
vision. Had he failed to act immediately, he would have been
unconscious in less than six seconds. Bob's self- training
saved him. In the event of dizziness, one should assume low
oxygen and inject gas immediately, any gas. In fact, it is
wise to inject both diluent and oxygen simultaneously since
six seconds is seldom enough time to do more than one thing.
If Bob's oxygen tank had not been turned on, attempting to
inject oxygen would have failed to solve the problem. Bob
injected gas then, for the first time that morning, he checked
his primary display. The lights were out. The problem was
immediately apparent; he had failed to turn on his rebreather.
Bob
turned on his rebreather and continued to assist me as I filmed
the jawfish. Not wanting to admit to suffering from almost
fatal stupidity, he didn't tell me he'd had a problem for
over two years.
Almost
every closed-circuit diver I know has failed to turn on his
rebreather or oxygen tank at least once. In the last two weeks
while filming here in Fiji, both Richard Pyle and Mark Thurlow
have admitted to this error.
Be
aware of the consequences of high oxygen partial pressures.
But fear, with all your heart, the consequences of low oxygen
levels
Not
wanting to admit such stupidity, Bob told me of his near black-out
while in Grand Cayman two years after the incident, and only
after he heard me relate my low-oxygen story to a group of
aspiring rebreather divers. Unlike Bob, who was too dumb to
turn his rig on in the morning, I had turned mine off on purpose.
I was using an IMAX® camera to film kelp at an island near
San Diego, California. I wanted to do a shot looking up the
kelp plant as I swam the camera up to just beneath the kelp
canopy. I didn't want any bubbles in the shot. So to minimize
bubbles, I exhaled most of the gas out of my counterlung and
turned my rebreather off so it wouldn't inject more gas (even
if that gas was rather important). I figured there was plenty
of oxygen left to keep me alive during that one short shot.
I was wrong. And yes, I admit the idea was completely stupid.
As
I swam just beneath the kelp canopy and only about two feet
below the surface, with the camera running, I suddenly saw
stars, felt dizzy, and then was plunged into a dark visual
tunnel that was narrowing at alarming speed. I checked my
oxygen level. It read .06 ppO2. Not enough to support life!
I barely had time to lift my head above the surface and take
a breath.
Howard
and Thurlow at 340 feet - ©Bob Cranston |
Checking
my instruments at the onset of hypoxia was dumb. A hypoxic
diver seldom has time to do more than one thing. I should
have immediately lifted my head or injected gas.
Divers
unfamiliar with rebreathers often fear them because they may
supply too much oxygen and cause oxygen toxicity and convulsions,
followed by drowning. While this is certainly possible, oxygen
convulsions are not a major danger when diving rebreathers.
Most divers use their rebreathers set at 1.3 or 1.4 pp02.
Oxygen convulsions become possible at 1.6. However, you would
have to be extremely unlucky to get a convulsion while diving
a malfunctioning rebreather at 1.6 for a few minutes. In fact,
most divers will get lucky and not be struck with oxygen toxicity
even at levels as high as 2.0 or even 3.0. Even the most complacent
dullard is likely to check his instruments before high 02
causes central nervous system toxicity.
Several
months ago I was descending past 200 feet in the La Jolla
submarine canyon with Mark Thurlow. Suddenly I turned and
he was gone. I looked up and saw Mark ascending rapidly while
blowing gas out through his nose. A moment later he resumed
his descent. When I asked Mark about it later, he sheepishly
admitted that he had accidentally injected oxygen during his
descent, rather than diluent. He noticed he had a problem
when he checked his oxygen readings and found the needle pegged
off the oxygen pressure scale. High oxygen levels do not necessarily
result in dire consequences.
Low
oxygen levels, however, should be feared absolutely. Low oxygen
levels can creep up on a diver quickly and are more likely
to happen near or at the surface than at depth. Hypoxia is
the cause of most rebreather fatalities.
Once
Bob Cranston began relating dumb rebreather mistakes, he seemed
unable to stop. He once jumped in and began a dive with all
of his electrical cables disconnected (the cables that connect
the rebreather computer to the mechanics of the system). But
a quick check of his instruments easily identified a problem,
and he had no trouble returning to the boat while injecting
gases manually.
Once
Bob jumped in with the cover of his rebreather unsecured and,
at the same time, the cover of his CO2 scrubber unlatched.
He didn't know he had a problem until the end of his dive
when, as he ascended with our underwater IMAX® system, his
cover popped off followed by the lid to his scrubber. Essentially,
his rebreather completely disassembled underwater. Bob might
not have mentioned this accident except that most of his buddies
were watching him at the time, and he could think of no way
to disguise his error.
Never
underestimate your capacity for doing something really stupid
My
best advise to an aspiring rebreather diver is to never underestimate
your capacity for doing something really stupid. Although
Bob's mistakes seem dumb (and certainly were), they are typical
experiences for most rebreather divers. I admit to making
an equal number of blunders. Actually, I make a few dumb mistakes
on every trip. Those that know me can easily understand my
predisposition for error. Smarter divers would seem less likely
to screw up.
Richard
Pyle is a smart guy, most of the time. But, like Bob, he too
has had problems with flooding his counterlung. He once jumped
overboard with his breathing hoses disconnected. This mistake
immediately resulted in a mouthful of water and flooded rebreather.
Richard went to the surface, adjusted his full-face mask,
and jumped back in assuming his full-face mask had leaked.
Since his hoses were still disconnected, his rebreather flooded
again.
Of
course, making that kind of mistake near the surface seems
far less frightening than having a complete failure 300 feet
below the surface. But Richard has done that too. Richard
told me that he once forgot to insert the drain plug in his
rebreather prior to a deep dive. When he looked under a rock
at 300 feet, turning his rebreather upside down, all the gas
flowed out the hole and his counterlung immediately filled
with water. Richard's next breath was entirely saline. Fortunately,
Richard always carries plenty of bailout gas. He switched
to open-circuit, one of his buddies noticed the open orifice
and reinserted the plug. Richard then completed his dive.
Carry
sufficient open-circuit bailout, and be prepared to use it
Switching
to open-circuit is the last resort when things go wrong on
a rebreather. Most problems can be solved by monitoring instruments
and adding gases manually. But when everything melts down
you need enough open circuit gas to get you to the surface.
In over just over 1,000 hours of rebreather diving, I've been
forced to switch to open circuit less than a half dozen times.
Twice I had oxygen o-rings blow out leaving the rig with no
oxygen supply. In both cases, I had plenty of oxygen in the
counterlung for ten minutes or more on the bottom before switching
to open circuit and ascending. In other instances, I lost
the loop.
Failure
of the counterlung to hold breathable gas is called "losing
the loop." This has happened to me several times due to perforated
breathing hoses or torn mouthpieces. It doesn't take much
of a hole before the loop becomes unbreathable.
While
diving at Cocos Island, I developed a tear in my mouthpiece.
The hole was small, but the small amount of salt water that
entered the loop reacted chemically with the carbon dioxide
scrubber materials. The foam rubber water-absorbers inside
my counterlung melted, and the gas became very unpleasant
to breath. Back on the surface, I fixed the torn mouthpiece
by installing a new one. I should have secured the new mouthpiece
with a mouthpiece tie. Oops!
An
hour into my next dive I turned my head to get Bob's attention
and the mouthpiece popped off. Bob and Mark thought I looked
pretty stupid with the mouthpiece sticking out of my mouth
and the hoses floating high above my head. Of course, the
counterlung immediately flooded. I switched to open-circuit.
Pushing
the envelope
During
our current film production, Coral Reef Adventure, my crew
and I have logged more than twenty deep trimix dives, many
of which were well below 300 feet. Our purpose for making
these dives was to film, in the IMAX® format, Richard Pyle
capturing undescribed fish species on the deep reef. On some
of these dives we descended to below 300 feet with two underwater
IMAX® cameras. Planning this film sequence seemed like a good
idea at the time.
One
characteristic of closed-circuit mixed-gas rebreathers that
make them seductive is their ability to support dives to over
500 feet and theoretically to over 1500 feet. Unfortunately,
the normal tendency of divers like myself to lapse into casual
stupidity is not so benignly tolerated on deep trimix dives.
Trimix
rebreather dives require multiple gas switches, computer manipulation,
huge amounts of bailout gas of various mixtures, and hours
of decompression. The degree of complication provides an enormous
increase in the number of ways a diver can screw up.
Of
course, I take trimix dives very seriously. Unfortunately,
that hasn't prevented me from making serious mistakes. My
most serious error was forgetting to make a gas switch on
a dive to below 350 feet. The result was a visit to the Fiji
Recompression Facility and hours of recompression therapy.
In
the weeks that followed, I decided that forgetting to make
the gas switch was understandable, considering the complexity
of the dive and the demands on my attention when attempting
to film at that depth with a 300-pound camera system. To remember
the various gas switches and computer adjustments, I needed
a checklist. This is the solution pilots have discovered for
minimizing embarrassments such as finding oneself stuck at
the end of the runway after skidding to a halt with the landing
gear up.
During
the trimix dives that followed my bends incident, my crew
and I have found the checklist invaluable. Now, if only I
can remember to look at it.
It
now seems inevitable that rebreathers will become increasingly
commonplace with sport divers around the world. Certainly
there will be accidents as, through trial and error, divers
develop the protocols for using these complicated machines.
But for those divers who are willing to accept the risks and
train themselves accordingly, rebreathers will open a new
world of opportunity for underwater exploration. |